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Post-Global Financial Crisis: The Measure of the “Beijing consensus” 
as a Variety of Capitalisms 
M. Ulric Killion∗ 
Abstract 
In order to explore the prospective effects of what hails as the Beijing 
consensus, a conceptualization arguably near-synonymous with Beijing’s 
export-oriented strategy, the Article first discusses the state of the Chinese 
economy in the post-global financial crisis era. After reviewing some key 
indicators of the country’s economy, the Article presents a comparison 
between a Washington and Beijing consensus, contrasting ideological 
meanings between these two consensuses, and then explores the measure 
of the Beijing consensus as a variety of capitalisms. By doing so the 
Article reveals the broader role of Beijing’s export-oriented strategy and 
its eventual relation to international capital’s industrial transformation and 
the prospective effects of a Beijing consensus. The Article concludes by 
presenting a prospectus of the Beijing consensus as a variety of 
capitalisms in the post-global financial crisis era. By presenting the 
Beijing consensus or even export-oriented strategy as an evolving model 
in this new era, China’s trade and finance models prospectively present a 





China’s seemingly quick recovery from the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, or post-global 
financial crisis, is amazing to some, the envy of others. In the midst of the post-global 
financial crisis, though China admits that its economy still needs tweaking (He, 2009), on 
December  6, 2009, Yao Jingyuan, chief economist with the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS), announced, “China will, without any doubt, be able to achieve the 8 percent 
growth in gross domestic product (GDP) this year” (China’s 8% economic growth, 2009). 
This and similar announcements by China’s official news sources have led to conjectures 
by many of the consequences that may attend China’s economic resilience, especially as 
other (both developing and developed) countries still appear caught in the fangs and 
claws of the global financial crisis. For many, China’s economic growth, growth rates, 
and growing economic prowess present issue of the measure of what many characterize 
as the Beijing consensus. 
Then there are those who would lend superlatives to describe China’s economic 
recovery. Such as Martin Jacques (2009), who titled his recent book, When China Rules 
the World. Seth Faison (2009) wrote a book review of Jacques’s book. While noting that 
Jacques presented “a compelling and thought-provoking analysis of global trends that 
defies the common Western assumption,” he still opines that Jacques “stumbles badly 
when trying to describe what a new Chinese-led international order might look like.” 
Although Faison generally perceives that any “books about the future never get it right,” 
the critical issue of what China presents to a Western world may need additional 
clarification, or simply, a new measure of the Beijing consensus. 
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In the context of China, there are the issues of whether there is still a Western 
consensus such as an American or Washington consensus, and even whether there is 
China or Beijing consensus standing in opposition to a Washington consensus. There is 
also the forward-looking issue of whether there are new evolving forms of modern 
political economy. All of which will prospectively affect all models of development, 
including modern developments in trade and finance models or theories. A prime 
example is Shaun Rein’s (2009) characterization of a new international order as, and 
borrowing from the title of his article, The New Post-Lehman Capitalist World.  
The Article, at Part 2, in order to understand a broader role of Beijing’s export-
oriented strategy in promoting economic growth, briefly explores the state of the Chinese 
economy in the post-global financial crisis era by reviewing some of the key indicators of 
the country’s economy. The Article, at Part 3, then presents a horizontal comparison 
between a Washington consensus and Beijing consensus. Then, at Part 4, the Article 
discusses contrasting ideological meanings that influence both a Washington and Beijing 
consensus. The Article, at Part 5, then explores the measure of the Beijing consensus as a 
variety of capitalisms. While doing so, the Article also discusses the broader role of 
Beijing’s export-oriented strategy and its eventual relation to international capital’s 
industrial transformation. Finally, at Part 6, the Article concludes by presenting a 
prospectus of the Beijing consensus as a variety of capitalisms in the post-global financial 
crisis era.  
All of this, ultimately, presents the dynamics and evolutionary path of modern 
economic reform as the measure of the Beijing consensus, while also challenging, though 
historically a static model, the dynamics and evolutionary path of the varieties of 
capitalism theory. In the post-global financial crisis era by presenting the measure of the 
Beijing consensus as a model evolving into a new model of capitalism, or simply, an 
evolution in the variety of capitalisms. China’s trade and finance models or theories, 
though with Chinese characteristics, arguably present a distinctive modeling of capitalism 
and its tools of trade and finance models or theories. 
 
2. THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
 
As earlier mentioned, in 2009, Yao Jingyuan, a chief economist with the NBS, 
announced that China would achieve the 8 percent growth in GDP for the year (China’s 
8% economic growth, 2009). Both the data and announcement from the NBS beg the 
question of whether China actually experienced the global financial crisis. This is 
because after discovering that the service sector played a larger role than earlier thought 
or anticipated, on December 26, 2009 (Si, 2009), the NBS also announced that the 
country’s economy grew by 9.6 percent in 2008, which is 0.6 percentage points more 
than earlier estimates for 2008. 
The 2010 economic forecast by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
a government think tank, was also notable. This is because the CASS also forecasted that 
in 2010 China’s economic growth would exceed 9 percent. The latter projection is set 
forth in the CASS’s 2010 annual report on the economy, which is its Economy of China 
Analysis and Forecast (Chen and Li, 2010), or simply, China’s 2010 Economic Blue 
Book. On December 7, 2009, China released the 2010 Economic Blue Book, which 
forecasted that economic growth would reach 8.3 percent in 2009, while rising to 9.1 
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percent in 2010 (Yan Pei, 2009). The 2010 Economic Blue Book also addressed other key 
economic indicators such as economic growth and stability. 
As for foreign trade, or the export sector, as the CASS forecasted, trade volume 
would grow by 10 percent, though total trade volume would drop by 14-15 percent in 
2009 compared to 2008, and export volume would experience a 15 percent growth. The 
CASS expected trade surplus for 2009 to stand between US$180-190 billion (Hao, 2009). 
The CASS’s 2010 Economic Blue Book essentially forecasted the recovery of foreign 
trade or the export sector in 2010.  
The drop in trade volume in 2009, when comparing year-on-year trade volume in 
2008, is largely attributable to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, or simply, the fall of the 
investment banker Lehman Brothers, which eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. In September 2008, three of the larger Chinese commercial banks (i.e., the 
People’s Bank of China, China Merchants Bank, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China) immediately felt the onset of the global financial crisis. These commercial banks 
disclosed their exposure to the worsening US financial crisis through bonds issued by 
investment bank Lehman Brothers, notwithstanding twenty-two US banks failing in 2008, 
with banks rushing to conclude new deals as the Wall Street crisis deepened (e.g., 
Morgan Stanley discussing merger with Wachovia; UK mortgage lender HBOS Plc 
striking a stock deal with Lloyds TSB that creates a 28 billion pound or $50 billion 
mortgage giant) (Killion, 2009). 
The US sub-prime mortgage crisis did affect China’s 2008 economic growth and 
future growth, as the economic growth of China, like other countries or economies, 
would be constrained by new US woes. As previously mentioned, China is aware that its 
economy still needs tweaking (He, 2009). This is because the financial crisis did affect 
many sectors of the country’s economy (i.e., from housing, energy, exports, banking and 
finance, labor or employment and other sectors). The global financial crisis also 
precipitated external economic market forces that affected China, as it did other (both 
Asian and non-Asian) countries or economies.  
Nonetheless, as earlier mentioned, the 2010 Economic Blue Book forecasted the 
recovery of foreign trade or the export sector. According to Pei Changhong (2009a), an 
expert on finance and trade at the CASS, in 2010, foreign trade volume is expected to rise 
10 percent year-on-year, with about a 15 percent increase in exports. During the 
December 2009 release of the 2010 Economic Blue Book by the CASS, Pei confidently 
announced that, in 2010, the foreign trade volume would rise back to the 2008 level. For 
2009, Pei announced that although a negative growth of foreign trade volume trading is 
inevitable, the country’s economy still sees a surplus.  
The global financial crisis did affect the country’s economy, especially in foreign 
trade or the export sector. As many experts recognize, China is predominantly an export-
driven economy. In the past exports have served as the primary engine driving the 
country’s economic growth. A problem for China is that the global financial crisis 
challenged the primacy of exports as one of the key engines of economic growth. As the 
US sub-prime mortgage crisis struck leading importers of Chinese products, which are 
predominantly the US and European Union (EU) markets, China’s economy felt the 
affect of constricted consumption abroad or in foreign markets, and a reduction in the 
volume of Chinese imports. 
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Despite the optimism of Pei and the CASS and its 2010 Economic Blue Book, 
foreign trade, or the export sector, still has an arduous journey back to the 2008 level or 
earlier levels. This is because, before 2008, the country’s exports experienced an annual 
growth rate as high as 25 percent annually (Ding, 2009). The global financial crisis 
affected China’s exports by causing exports to decline in November 2008, though the 
decline has slowed in recent months. For this reason, in the post-global financial crisis era, 
it is unreasonable to portend business as usual or even what a Beijing consensus might 
characterize as a return to normalcy in foreign trade. Moreover, despite the positive 
outlook of the 2010 Economic Blue Book, many authorities in Beijing recognize the truth 
of a new global reality.  
For instance, Chen Deming, the minister of commerce, effectually acknowledged 
this new global reality when describing the 2010 outlook for exports as still grim. Chen 
clearly recognizes that a growth in exports is contingent on foreign consumption or 
demand and foreign imports. During a ministry’s working conference, Chen said, “It is 
impossible that growth of the exports will recover to the high of before 2008 over the 
next three years or even longer” (Ding, 2009). While the both US and EU markets show 
some signs of economic growth during that third quarter of 2009, according to Chen, 
their growth rates are hardly sufficient enough to rejuvenate China’s export market. 
Contrary to the CASS and its 2010 Economic Blue Book, as Pei explained, “We cannot 
be much positive about the prospects” (Ding, 2009). 
In 2009, during the height of the global financial crisis, according to Zhang Tao, 
one of the editors of the 2010 Economic Blue Book, China’s economic growth was 
largely attributable to investments. In 2010, however, investments would continue to 
grow, though eventually slowing down (Qiang, 2009). This also serves as a clear example 
(i.e., the 14 to 15 percent drop in total trade volume) of how the global financial crisis 
affected China, as it did other Asian economies.  
As observed by Chen Jiagui, chief editor of the 2010 Economic Blue Book, “the 
investment, consumption, export, commodity price, and other indexes all show a 
tendency of moderate climbing in the coming year” (Qiang, 2009). Chen also realizes 
that China is not yet free and clear from the fangs and claws of the global financial crisis. 
This is because the impact of the global financial crisis, as Chen explained, “would still 
last for a while and the expansion of consumer demands, especially domestic civil 
demands, requires a long period, so the macro economic policies would focus on 
ensuring a stable and relatively fast economic growth, preventing dramatic changes” 
(Qiang, 2009).  
The notion of expanding consumer demand, admittedly, is critical and associates 
with China’s new urbanization policy, which China’s polity is employing as a means to 
bolster GDP growth. Many Chinese experts (e.g., Wang Tao, Li Bingren, and San 
Mingchu) perceive that, “The recent tightening of China’s real estate policies is unlikely 
to have a negative impact on the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth this year, 
being offset by accelerating urbanization and strong growth in fixed asset investment” 
(Hu, 2010). For instance, Wang Tao, head of UBS Securities’ China Economic Research, 
opined, “Though property developers may postpone or halt construction due to the 
government’s real estate policies, we believe that China’s urbanization can make up for 
these side effects on the country’s economy, and the nation can still maintain 10 percent 
GDP growth this year” (Hu, 2010).  
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As the WTO Secretariat, in the third Trade Policy Review of China (WTO, 2010), 
observed:  
 
The global recession had a substantial adverse impact on China’s economy 
as external demand fell sharply from the end of 2008. The Government’s 
response of expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, including a Y4 
trillion (13% of 2008 GDP) stimulus package, helped China’s economic 
growth to rebound in 2009 and made an important contribution to global 
recovery elsewhere, particularly in the Asia region.   
 
The global economic crisis has reinforced China’s determination to 
transform its pattern of economic development, including through 
structural diversification, improving the functioning of the domestic 
capital market and strengthening social safety nets for the population. 
Looking ahead, as the Government pursues policies to increase the role of 
domestic demand in underwriting China’s growth and to encourage the 
expansion of the services sector, further liberalization of the trade and 
investment regimes is called for to foster competition and achieve more 
efficient allocation of resources in the economy. 
 
Nonetheless, China or perhaps even the Beijing consensus, though its economy 
still needs tweaking, continues to demonstrate a strong economic resilience. This also 
presents issues of the measure of a Beijing consensus and the relation of a Beijing 
consensus to a Washington consensus. 
 
3. THE BEIJING AND WASHINGTON CONSENSUS 
 
As for the Washington consensus, it has been a controversial subject since its origin some 
twenty years ago. It is a concept that many attribute to the British economist John 
Williamson, though there has always been disagreement about the existence of such a 
consensus. Then there those who earlier prescribed to the Washington consensus that 
now declare the consensus as dead. For instance, at the 2009-G20 summit in London, 
former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown actually declared the consensus as dead, 
though during the same period he also called for a new global order (i.e., global 
cooperation) as a guard against the emergence of financial mercantilism (Summers, 2009). 
For Williamson, however, the Washington consensus is still alive so long as there is a 
successful disassociation from the neoliberal development model. During an April 12, 
2009 interview, Williamson actually employed the words “a neoliberal tract” (John 
Williamson Conversation, 2009). 
As for a definitional meaning of the Washington consensus, it is generally 
describable as, “an American consensus or Washington consensus that assumes adjusting 
firms, governments, employees, farmers, and citizens serve the greater good in general to 
the exigencies of competition within increasingly deregulated and global markets. The 
American consensus or Washington consensus refers to the policies of neo-liberal 
economists, which are, essentially, policies for promoting economic growth in Latin 
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American countries and other countries, by promoting free market oriented economic 
reforms” (Killion, 2007). 
Many proponents of what Williamson characterized as a “neoliberal tract” find 
the nomenclature of neoliberal as troublesome or even objectionable. In its origins, in the 
1970s and 1980s, the concept of neoliberalism emerges with the onset of debt crises in 
developing countries. Its origins also associate with earlier development theories or 
models. Such as dependency theory (dependencia or dependencia school), which is 
largely attributable to the works of Raúl Prebisch (1950) and his colleagues (i.e., the 
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis or Singer-Prebisch thesis). In the 1950s, dependency theory 
develops in response to growing concerns that economic growth in developed countries 
does not necessarily lead to commensurate growth in developing countries, especially 
Latin American countries (Killion, 2007). In terms of the orthodoxy of economic 
liberalism, from the late 1940s to the 1980s, dependency theory ruled. 
Lying at the core of Prebisch’s thesis is the idea that the state of poverty of these 
developing countries is attributable to the many developing countries lagging behind the 
scientific transformations or the Enlightenment values of the European states or Western 
developed countries. In other words, developing countries, especially Latin American 
countries, pursuant to Prebisch’s thesis, are poor because of their coercive integration into 
a Western economic system as producers of raw materials or as repositories of cheap 
labor, and the denial of an opportunity to market their resources. This also evidences 
problematic inherent ideological meanings in dependency theory and neoliberalism. 
It is during the 1970s, and pursuant to growing interests in international 
economics, that the antagonists of economic liberalism and globalization begin the usage 
of the nomenclatures of neoliberal and neoliberalism. A problem is that those proponents 
subscribing to the tenants of so-called neoliberalism would much rather prefer to 
themselves as libertarians, free marketers or conservatives. Neoliberalism is also the 
name that associates with the politico-economic restructuring or reform programs of the 
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) (i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank). These restructuring or reform programs are proposals for developing 
countries designed by developed country-economists, the IMF, and the World Bank. 
Some even refer to these structural adjustments programs of the BWIs as simply 
neoliberal reforms (Kleinback, 1999). 
Then there is the issue of a Beijing consensus, though also a subject of 
controversy. As for the etymology of the phrase—the Beijing consensus, many consider 
the phrasing as being attributable to Joshua Cooper Ramo and his article entitled, The 
Beijing consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power (2004). When 
introducing this phrase, Ramo (2004) wrote: 
 
China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying 
to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit 
into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly 
independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world 
with a single massively powerful centre of gravity. I call this new physics 
of power and development the Beijing Consensus. It replaces the widely-
discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory made famous in 
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the 1990s for its prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to telling 
other nations how to run themselves.  
 
What Ramo characterized as the Beijing consensus, like the Washington 
consensus, associates with models for economic development. For Ramo, the Beijing 
consensus also offers a more dynamic model than the Washington consensus. This is 
because “the emergence of a Beijing consensus for development marks an important 
change for China, a shift from a reform process that was young and susceptible to 
externalities to one that is now self-fulfilling, cranking like a chain reaction and more 
determined by its internal dynamics than by the external pushes and pokes of things like 
WTO accession, nuclear proliferation rules or even mass viral epidemics” (Ramo, 2004). 
For Ramo, the Beijing consensus also encompasses socio-political concerns such as 
“politics, quality of life, and the global balance of power.”  
An emerging Beijing consensus, as Barry Sautman (Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology) explained, “takes seriously some aspirations of developing 
states often ignored or opposed by the West,” such as “a more equitable international 
distribution of wealth and power” (Cha, 2009). The problem from a Western perspective 
is that what many describe as the Beijing consensus associates with China’s creative 
international finance methods; i.e., loans to developing, least-developed (LDCs), and 
third world countries.  
An earlier perception that China was employing international finance as a tool of 
international diplomacy so alarmed a Western world that, in September 2006, a statement 
from the G-7 group and a US Treasury report warned China against overloading 
developing and least-developed African countries, and other developing countries, with 
“high-priced loans” they cannot avoid to pay. The US Treasury report described loans to 
African countries such as Ghana, Mozambique, and Sudan as opportunistic loans (WSJ, 
2006).  
In recent years, China, admittedly, may have tempered its approach to 
international diplomacy via its creative approaches to international finance. This is 
because, as of 2010, China’s loans to developing or poor countries are seemingly less 
pricey, as seen in some instances of Chinese investments in southeastern Europe. There 
are some sources, however, that would still describe China’s investments in the region of 
southeastern Europe as an investment offensive. 
A clear example of the less pricey-variety of loans occurred in the Balkans, when 
the Export Import Bank of China (or China Eximbank) granted Belgrade a billion euro 
($1.3 billon) loan to upgrade two power plants and, in the spring of 2010, commence the 
construction of a bride over the Danube River. Dusan Reljib, from the EU External 
Relations division of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 
described the Chinese presence as “gathering momentum right across the region. ‘The 
Chinese are in Slovenia, in Macedonia, they’re exporting buses to Skopje, they’re talking 
to Croatia about transport facilities, harbors, airports, railway connections,’ he said ‘and 
they’ve been talking to the Greeks about leasing possibilities in Athens harbor’” (Walker, 
2010). 
According to Reljib, and illustrating a more seasoned approach or less pricey-
approach by Beijing, “With very little direct foreign investment coming into the region, 
tight government budgets and unemployment rates on the rise again, he says Balkan 
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states need and welcome China’s money, which comes with grace periods, generously 
low interest rates and very few strings attached. ‘The Chinese do not attach economic or 
political conditions to their loans,’ Reljic said. ‘In a way, cheap Chinese money is an 
alternative to commercially expensive Western money or politically expensive money 
from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank’” (Walker, 2010). 
It is perhaps a matter of a Beijing-form of creative international financing rather 
than a familiar Washington-form of capitalism. China’s new cheap money, however, 
though admittedly now seemingly less pricey, may come with an attendant higher 
political costs than many anticipate. For this reason, recipients of China’s investment 
offensive should be cautious. This is because, as warned by Kerry Brown of the Asia 
Program at London’s Chatham House,  
 
China wants to remake the world and is disappointed that the world won’t 
comply. Brown said. It is guided by self-interest and is happy to abuse 
friendships. He says China, which has itself stated its national aim of 
becoming a strong and wealthy country, is often hard for foreign partners 
to understand, which is why smaller countries like those in the Balkans 
should be aware of what they want from a partnership with Beijing. If 
countries say yes to everything, they have the complication of becoming a 
tributary state of China (Walker, 2010). 
 
This does not mean that the Washington consensus, and its attendant loans or 
investments programs (i.e., IMF and World Bank loans) and conditionalities (e.g., 
Articles of Agreement of the IMF, Art. V, sec. 3(a), “The Fund shall adopt policies on the 
use of its general resources. . .”), is without political costs. Both a Washington and 
Beijing consensus come complete with the baggage of political costs. Moreover, despite 
these political costs, a remaining problem for both a Washington and Beijing consensus is 
that neither a Washington nor Beijing consensus seems subject to definitive 
substantiation, thereby still leaving us with controversial topics.  
Contrary to the beliefs of many, it is actually difficult to verify the existence of a 
Beijing consensus. For instance, there is not even an accord on the idea of a distinctive 
“China Model” of development. A case in point is a collection of articles recently 
published by the Study Times, which is a newspaper run by the Party School of the 
Central Committee of the CPC. In December 2009, the Study Times, though to the 
surprise of many, published four articles that directly addressed the issue of a “China 
Model.” All of the articles concluded for various reasons that the “China Model is not a 
good saying” (Senior Officials, 2009).  
There is a consensus on neither the Beijing consensus nor “China Model.” 
Demonstrating the diverging opinions, The Economist (2010) characterized the Beijing 
consensus as simply meaning, “to keep quiet.” This is because “Scholars and officials in 
China itself, however, are divided over whether there is a China model (or “Beijing 
consensus” as it was dubbed in 2004 by Joshua Cooper Ramo, an American consultant, 
playing on the idea of a declining “Washington consensus”), and if so what the model is 
and whether it is wise to talk about it. The Communist Party is diffident about laying 
claim to any development model that other countries might copy” (The Economist, 2010). 
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There are, admittedly, those who would disagree and instead advocate that there is 
a distinctive “China Model.” David Shambaugh (2010), a professor and director of the 
China Policy Program at George Washington University, when assessing whether there is 
a “China model,” generally concluded that there is what he characterized as China’s real 
“model.” A pivotal consideration for Shambaugh is whether there exits a model that is 
common among other newly industrialized countries. Thus, presenting a model that is 
transferable abroad. Shambaugh, though recognizing the lack of an agreement on a 
“China Model” among Chinese scholars, writes, 
 
In sum, when considering these four factors, one must conclude that while 
there are some individual elements of China’s development experience 
that are unique, they do not constitute a comprehensive and coherent 
“model”- nor are they easily transferred abroad. If anything, what is 
unique about China’s model is that it flexibly adapts to elements imported 
from abroad and grafted on to domestic roots in all fields, producing a 
unique hybrid and eclectic system - this is China’s real “model.” 
 
Moreover, even assuming the Beijing consensus is opportunistic or even 
mercantilist (a term [mercantile] that the physiocrat or economiste Marquis de Mirabeau 
coined (Cole, 1965)), it is still, in many respects, hardly distinguishable from a 
Washington consensus. This is because both forms of consensus, ultimately, intend to 
influence state or organizational behavior and models of economic development, though 
the methods, goals, policies, and inherent ideological meanings are distinguishable. 
 
4. CONTRASTING IDEOLOGICAL MEANINGS 
 
The contrasting ideological meanings, admittedly, present a problem. This is because the 
issue of how socialist or capitalist “they” are becomes an issue of how socialist or 
capitalist “we” are, and vice versa. In a post-global financial crisis world, there are no 
pristine models of either socialism or capitalism and other adjectives intending to 
describe the polities and economies of the world. But then again, this was a truism that 
held true as early as the beginning of the twentieth century. For example, even what 
Williamson characterized as “a neoliberal tract” evidences an earlier evolutionary change 
in capitalism, notwithstanding other earlier evolutionary changes (e.g., the marginal 
revolution, “ordinal revolution” of the 1930s, and Keynesianism). 
The characterizations of the forms of political economy that many suspect will 
evolve from the global financial crisis are many, notwithstanding Rein’s (2009) 
conceptualization of a new post-Lehman capitalist world. In the post-global financial 
crisis era, the suggestions are many and reflect a variety of models, theories, approaches, 
disciplines, and even ideological meanings. In other words, economists do not enjoy 
exclusivity in describing the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
For instance, there is the characterization by Dario Bevilacqua and Jessica 
Duncan (2010) of a new cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes socio-political concerns of 
the political economy model as opposed to economic concerns. When addressing their 
distinctive characterization of a new world order, Bevilacqua and Sapienza were 
addressing the issue of where is the way to a new cosmopolitanism in a new world, which 
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is interconnected by the wide spread travel of goods and global regulations. In answer, 
Bevilacqua and Sapienza distinguishably promoted the argument of a new global 
reflexive interactive democracy serving as a new mechanism for civil society 
participation. They argue for global regulations that need to follow a democratic pattern, 
which pursues integration without compromising pluralism, while also reducing 
fragmentation without denying legal and cultural differences. In other words, a proposed 
new model for global decision-making, as Bevilacqua and Sapienza explained, which 
effectually conjoins associative and deliberative democracy. 
The prospective descriptions of a new world order are many. For instance, during 
panelists discussions hosted by the IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates (IHS 
CERA), at CERAWeek 2010, both Steven Chu, the U.S. Energy Secretary, and Robert D. 
Hormats, U.S. undersecretary of state for economics, energy, and agricultural affairs, 
attended (U.S. Secretary of Energy, 2010). However, when delivering a speech to the 
panelists, Hormats distinguishably suggested a new global redesign. He spoke of a new 
model that entails countries and economies increasingly working together to address 
climate change, energy supply and demand, and debt issues (Dittrick, 2010). 
What distinguishes Hormats’s suggestion of a new global design is that it 
encompasses both socio-political and economic concerns in a prospective model for a 
new global reality. Hormat, who is Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s top economic 
official, and advises her on international economic policy, made the opening speech of 
the conference. “We have the opportunity as policy makers and as business people in this 
generation to take advantage of historic opportunities resulting from changes in the global 
economy from the new global economic geography, if you will,” Hormats said. “Or we 
have the opportunity … to make some very historic mistakes” (Tronche, 2010; Dittrich, 
2010). 
Some may perceive Hormat’s idea of a new global redesign as a more nuanced 
suggestion or model. This is especially true when comparing his prospective model with 
other more bold and explicit suggestions, such as Rein’s (2009) characterization of a new 
post-Lehman capitalist world and Bevilacqua and Duncan’s (2010) new cosmopolitanism. 
The more nuanced suggestions or models, however, are the order of the day, as are their 
variety.  
For example, many earlier perceived the G20 Summit as a step toward a new 
global economic order. In November 2008, during the U.S. presidency of George W. 
Bush, the first G20 Summit convened in Washington, and, in 2009, during the U.S. 
presidency of Barack Obama, the second G20 Summit convened in Pittsburgh. In 
anticipation of the G20 Summit in Pittsburg, Colin I. Bradford, Jr. and Johannes F. Linn 
(2009) wrote, 
 
The global crisis has moved the United States, along with the rest of the 
world, toward a new global economic order, with the G-20 summit as one 
of the principal manifestations of the new global governance system. . . It 
will take a clear and sustained commitment to a new set of values and 
strong leadership, especially from President Obama and the United States, 
to ensure that the G-20 summit is not a short-lived exception to what had 
been a long-standing stalemate in global governance reform. The 
effectiveness of the G-20 in addressing the global economic crisis could 
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lay the foundation for a new global order and provide the impetus for the 
many other necessary global governance reforms. 
 
From a similar perspective, in an earlier speech delivered in Istanbul, on October 
2, 2009, Dominique Strauss-Kahn (2009), the Director of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), also strongly intimated a new global order. First, Strauss-Kahn recognized 
the importance of a recent G-20 summit as providing the world with the tools to adapt 
global economic cooperation to the needs of the 21st century; giving new voice to 
emerging economies; and presenting a new mandate to the IMF. The global financial 
crisis, as Strauss-Kahn explained, has “provided us with an historic opportunity to 
reshape the global economic and financial framework—and thus to lay the foundations 
for strong and sustainable economic growth going forward.”  
According to Strauss Kahn, “By recognizing that a globalized world demands 
global cooperation on economic and financial matters, our leaders are committed to 
working in new and more collaborative ways—to ensure prosperity and peace for all of 
us.” The subtlety of his proposed new global order lies in its relation to an earlier world 
order borne of the crises surrounding both the Great Depression and World War II. As 
Strauss-Kahn observed, “following the calamities of the Great Depression and World 
War II, the world’s leaders came together to create a new global order to advance peace 
and economic cooperation and established the United Nations and the Bretton Woods 
organizations.”  
The earlier mentioned suggestions for new models or forms evolving in the post-
global financial crisis era addressed new forms or models of capitalism, which are 
implicit in this, though limited, sampling of potential new models or forms that widely 
range from the more explicit and bold, to the more subtle, more nuanced models.  
This suggestion of an evolution of the model of capitalism admittedly premises, at 
least partially, on inherent ideological meanings, or alternatively, the phenomenon of 
ideology or ideological phenomena. The Western ideal and its attendant forms or models 
and ideology enjoys neither genuine universality, nor a true exclusivity in the real reality 
of a new global economic geography. This is because, as concerns Western and non-
Western countries and economies, there are also contrasting models and suggestions for 
prospective models for a new global reality, and contrasting ideological meanings. In 
other words, the contrast between these models and suggestions also premise, at least 
partially, on contrasting ideological meanings. 
This is due to the contrasting inherent ideological meanings that traditionally 
distinguished capitalism from other forms of thought (e.g., Marxian and socialist forms of 
thought). There is also always present the traditional problem of (old and new) forms of 
thought. This is the traditional problem of ideas being clearly ideological, in that they 
serve ideological constructions (Privateer, 2006: 129). 
In the post-global financial crisis era, there is also a problem for the evolution of a 
new model or models of modern capitalism, which is the historical proclivity of 
humankind to struggle against the forces of nature and society. “The inherent problem is 
a conservative proclivity of societal institutions, especially those institutions that have 
been deemed successful, whether true or not in the past. As a result, in many societies, 
including China, there is a strong resistance to change, and change seems only to come 
with major social crises acting as catalysts for change” (Killion, 2006). In other words, as 
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a major social crisis the US sub-prime mortgage crisis, or global financial crisis, should 
eventually serve as a catalyst for change. Change that one reasonably suspects will be a 
new model or models of capitalism, including capitalism’s tools of trade and finance. 
 
5. THE VARIETY OF CAPITALISMS 
 
In terms of a potential new model or models, it is also critical to understand that in the 
twentieth century the classical model of capitalism experiences evolutionary changes (i.e., 
Darwinism). This is because capitalism evolves from its earlier origins, such as Adam 
Smith’s modern capitalism and even Max Weber’s rational bourgeois capitalism. The 
evolution did not commence (e.g., 18th-century France, Pierre-Francois Tubeuf and 
proto-industrialization (Lewis, 1993)) and then end with the advent of the nineteenth 
century-form of capitalism, which many also hail as modern capitalism. In terms of a 
historiography of modern capitalism (the 20th-century form), capitalism actually 
continued to evolve into new and different forms.  
As many now recognize, especially those economists who are proponents of the 
varieties of capitalism theory, modern capitalism (commencing in the 20th-century) 
defies description of being a model in the singular sense (Deeg and Jackson, 2006). For 
instance, Michel Albert (1998) described the development of two competing models of 
capitalism or, borrowing from the title of his book, Capitalisme contre capitalisme, or 
capitalism against capitalism. This is attributable to the ending of the Cold War (i.e., after 
1991), which produces an Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism (i.e., short-term profit, 
shareholders, etc.) and a Rhine model (i.e., long-term interest, capital-labor linkage, etc.). 
A confrontation between the models engenders capitalism against capitalism (Meng, 
2008). There are many economists, scholars, or theorists (e.g., Ronald Dore, William 
Lazonick, Mary O’Sullivan, Meng Jie, Richard Deeg, and Gregory Jackson) that have 
explored and continue to explore varieties of capitalism or the varieties of capitalism 
theory. 
Additionally, the previously mentioned economists, or perhaps even the varieties 
of capitalism-theorists, might challenge the suggestion of a more dynamic and 
evolutionary path-oriented, varieties of capitalism theory. This is because, as Deeg and 
Jackson (2007) explained, the comparative capitalisms as the embodiment of several 
diverse approaches and analytical frameworks have historically presented a static analysis, 
which is replete with a problematic routine bias toward predicting institutional stability, 
rather than change, especially evolutionary change.  
Despite these shortcomings, they still recognize the successes or accomplishments 
attributable to the comparative capitalisms literature. When describing these successes 
and accomplishments, Deeg and Jackson (2007) wrote: 
 
First and foremost it has analysed how core institutions of advanced 
political economies shape the behaviour of economic actors, such as 
business firms and interests associations. Most literature has focused on 
comparing the similarities and differences of institutional configurations. 
Second, it has shown how the interaction effects and complementarities 
among institutions within the same national context shape the behaviour of 
firms or other economic actors. Much energy has also been dedicated to 
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exploring the complementarities among various institutional elements, 
resulting in a number of stylized typologies of national economies as 
discrete and internally consistent ‘models’. Finally, this literature provides 
a framework for explaining how nations respond to economic shocks and 
forces such as globalization or European integration.  
 
 The problem of a relatively static analysis that Deeg and Jackson perceive as 
forthcoming from the comparative capitalisms literature remains as an increasingly 
recognized deficiency in the field. The problem is largely owing to scholars and theorists 
over emphasizing how institutions serve as constraints on economics agents (i.e., diverse 
national varieties of business organization), rather then emphasizing the origins or 
evolution of institutions. Their thesis became clearer, when they wrote: 
 
Changes in the institutional makeup of these national models over the last 
decade have made it increasingly clear that the CC literature has 
conceptual difficulties in explaining institutional change. For example, the 
concept of complementarities suggests international convergence would 
occur only slowly or not at all, since existing institutions reinforce one 
another and piecemeal borrowing of ‘best practices’ is likely to decrease 
efficiency. On the whole, this literature largely has portrayed institutional 
change as modest evolutionary change that leaves national distinctiveness 
intact. While some cases of institutional change appear consistent with this 
view, a growing body of empirical literature suggests that institutional 
change is often more profound and calls into question the very models of 
capitalism the literature so carefully constructed (Deeg and Jackson, 2007). 
 
 For these reasons, Deeg and Jackson advocated the introduction of a more 
dynamic perspective into the comparative capitalisms literature in answer to the problem 
of what they deem a relatively static perspective. In this respect, a more dynamic 
perspective could also arguably suggest the recognition, if not measure, of the Beijing 
consensus as a variety of capitalisms. As such, what hails as a Beijing consensus becomes 
an extension of an evolutionary path of the variety of capitalisms.  
This is a viable association (i.e., the Beijing consensus and variety of capitalisms) 
mostly do to the reality that China’s polity is pursuing a socialist political polity in 
conjunction with a capitalist economic policy. Since commencing earlier reforms and 
opening of the economic infrastructure and its institutions, the Chinese communists are 
developing a market economy, though characterized as a socialist market economy, 
which is replete with capitalism’s tools of trade and finance models or theories. 
Additionally, this also presents a viable association because of a West-centric 
view that often seems insistent on Westernizing Sinicism. This phenomenon presents 
problems from a Chinese perspective, however. As Yuan Zushe (2009) explained, “It can 
be seen that the Western view of China is not meant to understand or represent the reality 
of China in a true sense, but to construct the image of China needed by Western culture.” 
All of which, as earlier mentioned, demonstrates distinguishable and competing, inherent 
ideological meanings.  
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However, and serving as a reminder that there are no pristine models of either 
socialism or capitalism, contrasting inherent ideological meanings do not necessarily 
mean that China is less capitalist than Western developed countries and economies. There 
is still the problem of translating the meaning of China’s socialist political polity 
pursuing capitalist economic policy. In these respects, the economic policies of China 
demonstrate a greater degree of integration into the international market than many would 
admit, though admittedly a possible coincidence (i.e., the degree of integration) that even 
China’s polity failed to anticipate. 
For instance, as most now recognize, since earlier reforms (commencing in the 
1970s) China’s polity pursued an export-oriented strategy. Francois Gipouloux (1998) 
earlier characterized China’s export-oriented economic development model as “a 
manufacturing crescent, the vocation of which was to reach out to the world and conquer 
distant markets.” In criticism of Chinese policy, many Western experts generally 
perceived China as actually electing between two alternative patterns or policies— the 
“big bang” approach or reforms and the “gradualist” approach or gradual reforms (Woo, 
2003; Zhang, 2002).  
Such assessments of China’s development model, or even the Beijing consensus, 
arguably ignore the earlier reality of the country’s economy and the problems that 
associate with the implementation and institutionalization of economic reform. More 
importantly, such assessments also ignore the inherent inevitability of pursuing an export-
oriented strategy. “The initial choice of an open export-oriented strategy as the 
breakthrough point for reform,” as Pei Changhong and Peng Lei (2009b) explained, “had 
an inherent inevitability,” rather than being a blind imitation of other East Asian 
economies, and presumably other non-Asian economies. From the perspective of Pei and 
Peng, this inherent inevitability premises on essentially four underlying forces, which 
range from socio-political to economic concerns. 
First, the path and sequence of transitioning from a planned economy, especially 
in foreign trade, required a gradual relaxing of foreign trade planning (i.e., a gradual 
introduction of license, quotas, and administrative control measures). Foreign trade 
restructuring was not a simple matter of trade liberalization. According to Pei and Peng 
(2009b), “With the deepening of market-oriented reform, the degree of market distortion 
gradually decreased and quantitative control measures on foreign trade lessened until 
they were finally totally eliminated. The goal of reform was, on the one hand, through 
restructuring, to bring into play China’s comparative advantage and expand trade so as to 
relax foreign exchange constraints on economic development and, on the other, through 
trade protection, to development some specific industries and emerging industries so as to 
promote economic development.”  
Second, in terms of general economic restructuring, the absorption of foreign 
capital and establishing foreign-funded enterprises presented the most practical means for 
restructuring China’s foreign trade system. During the earlier reform period, domestic 
industries were still operating under a planning system and did not have access to 
international markets. Foreign-funded enterprises, however, presented the most viable 
means for bringing China’s comparative advantage (i.e., the factor endowment advantage 
of labor) into play through a more flexible employment system. Additionally, foreign-
funded enterprises also solved other problems. For instance, by virtue of foreign-funded 
enterprises, there is a solution to the problem of marketing by using the market contacts 
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of foreign investors.  There was also a solution presented for the problem of foreign 
exchange balance of payments by an ability to use a foreign capital market. 
The selling of products from foreign-funded enterprises in the Chinese market 
was now also providing domestic market profit incentives. The importance of foreign-
funded enterprises is attributable to China being able to develop an export-oriented 
manufacturing sector and increase its indigenous production and economic aggregate, 
while also accelerating economic development. 
Third, there are the earlier mentioned socio-political concerns. This is because 
official policy directing the pursuit of an export-oriented strategy also relates to both an 
earlier and present reality of economic life in Mainland China. During the earlier period 
of reforms, a primary concern was providing adequate food and clothing for China’s 
impoverished citizens, and the primary cause of poverty was the scarcity of jobs. The 
goals of creating jobs and industrial development made it inherently inevitable that 
industrial development had to be export-oriented. This is because of the earlier need for 
investment and production as a source of jobs. China, however, earlier lacked the funds 
and purchasing power to accomplish these goals without participation by foreign-funded 
enterprises. 
Although China is now demonstrating an economic prowess, the country’s 
economy is still plagued with socio-political problems that threaten economic growth and 
stability (e.g., from a widening economic gap between the rich and poor, to becoming one 
of the least equitable countries in the world). In the prioritization of economic growth, 
China is also incurring tremendous social costs because of inadequate social programs, 
while also struggling with other socio-political issues such as environmental degradation 
(Ru, Lu, and Li, 2009; presenting a fuller explanation of these socio-political issues in the 
2010 Society Blue Book). 
Fourth and finally, Pei and Pang characterized both exported-oriented production 
and international capital investment as critical choices of China’s open strategy. Although 
China’s factor endowment advantage of labor (i.e., lower wages than neighboring 
economies) provided an incentive for international investors, the arrangements made in 
the course of trade system restructuring came to coincide with the investment strategies 
of international capital, thus eventually presenting for China the historical opportunity of 
international capital’s industrial transformation. 
In these respects, China’s model of economic development, or the Beijing 
consensus, arguably represents a distinctive, though seemingly aberrant to many, model 
of capitalism evolving with distinctive Chinese characteristics. Although China’s 
economic development model or the Beijing consensus might not represent a pristine 
model of capitalism, it still arguably evidences an on-going evolution in the variety of 
capitalisms. While Ramo (2004) described the dynamics of the Beijing consensus, 
Shambaugh (2010) described the flexibility and adaptability of China’s model. Then 
Deeg and Jackson (2007) urged the varieties of capitalism-theorists to embrace a more 
dynamic perspective, rather than a reliance on the historical static form, which, by the 
theoretizations of scholars and theorists, denies the varieties of capitalism theory an 
evolutionary path. 
If ever there was moment in time ripe for the crystallization of new thoughts and 
forms, it is in the wake of the present global financial crisis. Thus, it seems not only 
reasonable but also genuinely conceivable that new forms will inevitably emerge from 
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the forces of nature and society. The unpristine ideals of socialism and capitalism and 
their variety will sway to the evolutionary forces of nature and society. This is because 
the present forms and shapes of socialism and capitalism hardly represent a beginning, 
middle, and end for the evolution of new thoughts and forms. At the end of the day, or 
post-global financial crisis, these emerging forms will reshape all models of polities and 
economies of the world. This includes their attendant (old and new) concepts and 
approaches to economic development, including what hails as a Beijing consensus and 
Washington consensus, and the tools of capitalism—trade and finance models or theories. 
All of this demonstrates the growing irrelevance of issues such as a Washington 
or Beijing consensus, notwithstanding that neither a Washington nor a Beijing consensus 
is subject to substantiation as existing in reality. In the post-subprime crisis world, it is 
also reasonable to suspect that capitalism, or modern capitalism, will experience further 
evolutionary changes. As Rein (2009) observed,  
 
In fact, if anything, capitalism is at its strongest right now, with hungry 
and hardened executives emerging from the panic to guide their 
companies into a new world. We are in a very Darwinian period, with the 
smartest and the cash-rich, like Kraft, scooping up assets on the cheap, 
while the weak and overleveraged, like Linens’n Things, collapse. This is 
capitalism at work.  
 
In a new world, such as what Rein described as the new post-Lehman capitalist 
world, or even the unique characterization by Bevilacqua and Sapienza (2010) of a new 
cosmopolitanism. The (old and new) concepts and approaches to economic development, 
including a Washington and Beijing consensus, by reason of the necessity of survival, 
will experience the influence of changes necessary in a post-global financial crisis world. 
In other words, assuming there is a Washington or Beijing consensus, they now present 
dual or competing consensuses that grow increasingly irrelevant.  
A so-called Washington or Beijing consensus, admittedly, could garner relevance 
in the post-global financial crisis era. It is relevance, however, necessarily contingent on 
change or adaptation to the new era, and prospectively, a new model or models of 
capitalism. A classic example of the need to evolve in the new post-global financial crisis 
era are earlier efforts by the World Bank, in the post-Cold War era (i.e., after 1991), to 
attempt to employ a more pragmatic approach to economic development, or simply, a 
more pragmatic neoliberalism (Killion, 2007). This is instead of a continuing reliance on 
policy that Williamson characterized as the traditional, though problematic, “neoliberal 
tract.”  
In the real reality of an evolving new global order, however, China serves as a 
reminder that history is not close to an end, as it issues a cultural, political and ideological 
challenge to those who entertain especially expansive and Western dialectic visions of 
world order (Killion, 2008). China and its socialist-political polity does so, however, 
though seemingly contradictory, by arguably distinctive Chinese capitalistic 
characteristics, and employing the tools of capitalism—capitalism’s tools of trade and 






As previously mentioned, there is the reality of China’s socialist political polity pursuing 
capitalist economic policy. Since earlier reforms (commencing in the 1970s) China is 
evolving from a planning system to a socialist market economy, and continuing to evolve 
through its “gradualist” approach to economic reform. Depending on the perspective of 
the observer, be it socialist or capitalist, China’s economy became either less socialist-
oriented or more capitalist-oriented, while also avoiding the pitfalls of the traditional 
“neoliberal tract.” Moreover, with Socialism now effectually off the agenda, the variety 
of capitalisms, as David Coates (2002) observed, “now occupies centre-stage in the 
debate on economic performance, and around that public debate a complex body of high-
quality academic work has emerged, addressed to the strengths and weaknesses of 
particular ways of organizing capitalists economies.” In the context of China, Coates’ 
observation has direct bearing.  
This is because once the China observer sees beyond the limitations of Western 
ideals and presumed social goods (e.g., democracy, judicial activism, etc), the observer 
will clearly witness the historical unfolding of a capitalist economy. The Chinese 
economy evolved from a planning system, to an open export-oriented strategy, and then 
to the historical opportunity of international capital’s industrial transformation. At the end 
of the day, and contrary to “China threat” theorists, China’s economic development 
model, or assumedly the Beijing consensus, by virtue of its “gradualist” approach to 
economic development is arguably evolving into a variety of capitalisms. Thus, in the 
post-global financial crisis era, presenting the measure of the Beijing consensus as a 
model evolving into a new model of capitalism, or simply, an evolution in the variety of 
capitalisms, though with distinctive Chinese characteristics in its modeling of capitalism 
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